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Background: The use of involuntary admission in psychiatry may be necessary to enable treatment and prevent harm,
yet remains controversial. Mental health laws in high-income countries typically permit coercive treatment of persons
with mental disorders to restore health or prevent future harm. Criteria intended to regulate practice leave scope for
discretion. The values and beliefs of staff may become a determinating factor for decisions. Previous research has
only to a limited degree addressed how legal criteria for involuntary psychiatric admission are interpreted by clinical
decision-makers. We examined clinicians’ interpretations of criteria for involuntary admission under the Norwegian
Mental Health Care Act. This act applies a status approach, whereby involuntary admission can be used at the presence
of mental disorder and need for treatment or perceived risk to the patient or others. Further, best interest assessments
carry a large justificatory burden and open for a range of extra-legislative factors to be considered.
Methods: Deductive thematic analysis was used. Three ideal types of attitudes-to-coercion were developed,
denoted paternalistic, deliberative and interpretive. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 10 Norwegian
clinicians with experience from admissions to psychiatric care were carried out. Data was fit into the preconceived
analytical frame. We hypothesised that the data would mirror the recent shift from paternalism towards a more
human rights focused approach in modern mental health care.
Results: The paternalistic perspective was, however, clearly expressed in the data. Involuntary admission was
considered to be in the patient’s best interest, and patients suffering from serious mental disorder were assumed
to lack decision-making capacity. In addition to assessment of need, outcome effectiveness and risk of harm,
extra-legislative factors such as patients’ functioning, experience, resistance, networks, and follow-up options were
told to influence decisions. Variation in how these multiple factors were taken into consideration was found. Some
of the participants’ statements could be attributed to the deliberative perspective, most of which concerned
participants’ beliefs about an ideal decision-making situation.
Conclusions: Our data suggest how a deliberative-oriented ideal of reasoning about legal criteria for involuntary
admission lapses into paternalism in clinical decision-making. Supplementary professional guidelines should be
developed.
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In the 1980-ies, a cultural shift towards more user-
orientation took place in public policy formation in high-
income countries. The users should no longer be treated
as passive recipients of welfare, nor should service pro-
viders behave like altruistic paternalists defining what was
in the best interest of the recipient [1]. Accordingly, the* Correspondence: eli.feiring@medisin.uio.no
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article, unless otherwise stated.paternalistic clinician-patient relationship was challenged,
and a more active role for the patient was called for.
Discussions about the use of coercive measures in medi-
cine were intense and new legislation that place greater
weight on patient autonomy and human dignity emerged
[2]. A human rights-orientation has since then become
increasingly influential in the development of mental
health care law.
Still, as Wealsh and Deahl put it: “The power to detain
and to treat a person against their will forms the backboneentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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used extensively in modern mental health care. This prac-
tice is, however, controversial. It is a serious deprivation of
individual liberty and autonomy and may be experienced
as gravely humiliating, even violent [4,5]. It is also shown
to affect marginalised persons more than others [6].
Involuntary admission and treatment have traditionally
been justified as measures to prevent suffering and to
give appropriate care, or offer protection from harm to
oneself and to others. These arguments often rest upon
four empirical premises. First, the person involved is
thought incapable of making rational decisions about
treatment. Second, the person involved will later be
grateful. Third, coercive measures are effective. Four, risk
assessment of dangerousness to oneself or others is reli-
able and valid.
Recent studies have demonstrated, however, that these
premises are without conclusive research-based support.
There is now evident that mentally ill patients may have
decision-making capacity [7-9], although evidence also
suggests that clinicians overestimate their patients’ com-
petence [9]. Further, there is little empirical knowledge
about the effects of involuntary care and the few studies
available have shown contradictory results [2,4,6,10].
Also, it is yet not known whether use of structured risk
assessment instruments improves practice [11]. The im-
plication is that the beneficiary effects of coercion are
harder to defend. Both professionally and politically,
discussions about the use and possible reduction are
called for [2,3].
Prior research has shown that the use of coercion varies
both within and between jurisdictions [12-14]. Differences
and changes in health care organisation and financing,
legislation, socio-demographic characteristics, diagnostic
patterns and patient characteristics play important roles in
explanations of such variations, but findings are incon-
clusive [6,15-17] Differences within countries also sug-
gest that local treatment cultures and staff attitudes
towards coercive measures may contribute to variations
[14,18]. In a multilevel analysis of attitudes to coercion,
some differences among wards were found, but most
variance could be attributed to individual staff level fac-
tors within wards [19].
A few quantitative studies of attitudes towards differ-
ent types of coercion have been carried out. In a national
U.S. survey of psychiatrists’ views about involuntary ad-
mission, respondents revealed a strong support for cri-
teria labeled danger to self, danger to others and grave
disability, as grounds for admission [20]. These findings
mirrored results from a previous study among psychia-
trists from Illinois [21]. A Norwegian study of prototyp-
ical attitudes between groups of stakeholders towards
the use of coercion, found similarly that psychiatrists
tended to agree with the view that protection from harmand the patient’s need of treatment and care justify coer-
cive measures [22]. In a study of Norwegian psychologists’
attitudes towards involuntary admission, the respondents
were asked about their views on three cases of patients
suffering from schizophrenia. Violence to others, followed
by the patient’s obvious suffering, was here seen as the
most important reasons to use coercion [23]. These find-
ings supported the findings of a study among German and
English psychologists presented with similar cases. A
study of attitudes of different stakeholders from differ-
ent European countries towards compulsory admission
of patients with schizophrenia, found that compulsory
procedures were based on traditions and personal atti-
tudes to a considerable degree [24].
The actual process by which clinicians arrive at the de-
cision to use involuntary admission depends in part on
legal criteria. Mental health law often uses criteria such
as “serious mental disorder”, “best interest”, “risk of harm”
and “need of treatment and care” to regulate the use of in-
voluntary admission. These criteria are, however, vague
and leave considerable scope for discretion. The criteria
may again be translated to different clinical concepts and
become proxy criteria for decisions. In addition, extra-
legislative factors stemming from the setting, the patient,
the decision-maker, and the availability of resources are
likely to influence the decision [25]. The values and beliefs
of the decision-maker may then become an important de-
termining factor.
There is a growing body of research on decision-making
about involuntary psychiatric admission, yet to our know-
ledge, no qualitative studies of how clinicians interpret
legal criteria in mental health care have been undertaken.
We wanted to investigate which choices clinicians make
when asked to decide whether to admit patients that are
unwilling to consent to mental health care. To illuminate
the complexity of deliberation in this context, we used a
qualitative research design. Specifically, we studied how ex-
perienced clinical decision-makers interpret and under-
stand the criteria regulating involuntary admission that are
laid down in the Norwegian Mental Health Care Act. The
objective was to explore how different perspectives about
clinician-patient interaction give rise to variations in the in-
terpretations of criteria for involuntary admission-decisions.
Methods
Study design
Data was collected by means of qualitative in-depth ex-
pert interviews. Deductive thematic analysis was used:
Theoretically driven questions were asked and the themes
that were identified from the data were fit into the precon-
ceived analytical frame [26]. This approach was chosen be-
cause we wanted theory-before-research to assist selecting
relevant questions, to help specify what we explored dur-
ing our interviews, and to aid in defining an appropriate
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at providing data that may give substance to prior studies
of decision making and hopefully be a vehicle for develop-
ing explanations.
Theoretical framework
We hypothesised that different models of the clinician-
patient relationship warrant different interpretations of the
legal criteria for involuntary admission and different assess-
ments of how to balance professional obligations against
legal norms. We utilised Emanuel and Emanuel’s [28] ideal
models of the clinician-patient relationship, specifically the
paternalistic, the deliberative and the interpretive model, to
highlight essential characteristics of the interaction be-
tween clinician and patient. According to the paternalistic
model, the clinician’s goal and obligation is to ensure the
best health outcome for the patient. Both the patient’s
medical condition and the best intervention strategy are
defined by objective criteria. Thus, the patient’s current
preferences are of limited value. He will ultimately come to
share the clinician’s assessment and be thankful for the de-
cisions made on his behalf. According to the deliberative
model, the clinician’s goal is to help the patient determine
and choose values that affect or are affected by the disease
and treatment. The clinician aims to persuade the patient
by engaging in dialogue on the best course of action. Pa-
tient autonomy is understood as self-development relevant
to medical care, and the patient’s current preferences are
open to revision through moral discussion. According to
the interpretive model, the clinician sees patient values as
inchoate and often conflicting. The clinician provides the
patient with information about the condition and the bene-
fits and risks of alternative interventions, and aims at eluci-
dating and interpreting the patient’s values through a
reconstruction of the patient’s goals and commitments.
The concept of patient autonomy is self-understanding,
which is realised when the patient comes to know how
medical interventions bear on his identity.
We chose to leave out one of Emanuel and Emanuel’s
descriptions in this study (the informative model), be-
cause it assumes that that the patient’s preferences for
intervention should be exercised without any attempt to
interfere with his control over medical decision making.
In the context of involuntary care, it seems prescriptively
inaccurate to make use of a conception of patient auton-
omy that does not incorporate some capacity to reflect
on and revise the understanding of the best alternative
intervention (so-called second order desires).
From this background, three ideal types of attitudes-
to-coercion were developed (cf. Table 1):
The paternalistic attitude
The patient suffering from a serious mental disorder is
thought to lack insight into his own medical condition.The paternalistic oriented clinician will regard coercion
as the best option available if the patient is unwilling to
consider voluntary mental care. Coercive care is viewed
as treatment as well as protecting the patient from
harming himself or others. For the paternalist, further
societal concerns are irrelevant. An overall assessment of
the patient’s best interest includes considerations of ben-
efits and harms relevant to medical care. The paternalis-
tic clinician would follow professional obligations should
these come to conflict with legal norms.The deliberative attitude
The patient suffering from a serious mental disorder is
thought to have some insight into his own medical con-
dition. The deliberative oriented clinician will engage the
patient in discussing the best intervention strategy and
aims to persuade the patient to voluntarily accept admis-
sion. If the deliberation does not make progress, coer-
cion might be viewed as necessary to provide care and
security to the patient. Intervention protects both the
patient and others from harm. An overall assessment of
the patient’s best interest includes considerations of
benefits and harms relevant to medical care as well as
considerations of follow up-options and prevention of
recurrence. The deliberative oriented clinician would try
to balance professional obligations against legal norms.The interpretive attitude
The patient suffering from a serious mental disorder is
thought to have some insight into his own medical condi-
tion, and his values should not be judged. The interpretive
practitioner views coercion as an offence. However, coer-
cion may sometimes be deemed a necessary evil to pre-
vent self-inflicted harm. An overall assessment of the
patient’s best interest includes considerations of benefits
and harms relevant to medical care including the costs re-
garding deprivation of liberty and the negative impact on
the therapeutic alliance between the patient and the clin-
ician, as well as the uncertainties that follow from lack of
scientifically demonstrated outcome effectiveness and the
prevalence of false positive predictions of dangerous acts
towards others. The interpretive clinician is critical to the
legitimacy of using coercive interventions in mental care.
Different declarations concerning professional ethics in
psychiatry express core values of the profession. Pelto-Piri
et. al. have pointed out how different perspectives are
reflected in the development of medical ethics in psych-
iatry, and how patient rights have become more in focus
in recent decades [29]. We expected the cultural shift
towards less paternalism and more patient autonomy, to-
gether with health care authorities’ presumption in favor
of patients’ self-determination, to be reflected in the par-
ticipants’ reasoning about involuntary admission.
Table 1 Comparing the attitudes- to- coercion dimensions
Paternalistic Deliberative Interpretive
Patient autonomy Assenting to objective values Self-development relevant to care Self-understanding relevant to care
Patient’s preferences Objective and shared Open to revision Requiring elucidation
Serious mental disorder Lack of insight Some insight Some insight
Voluntary care Not relevant Should try Should try
Coercive care Best intervention Provide care and security Offensive intervention
Treatability Effective Uncertain effects More harm than good
Harm to one-self Individual protection Individual care and security Individual care and security
Harm to others Individual protection Individual protection Societal protection Not relevant
Overall assessment Balance benefits and burdens
of intervention
Balance benefits and burdens of intervention,
including prevention, safety, follow-up
Balance benefits and burdens of
intervention, including costs of
integrity loss and distrust
Professional obligations Promote well-being Through dialogue, persuade the patient of
the best option
Elucidate and interpret patient
values
Professional obligations vs
legal criteria
Professional obligations trump
legal criteria
Professional obligations should balance
legal criteria
Critical attitude towards coercion in
mental care
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Norway has one of the highest per capita incomes in the
world, and is characterised by an egalitarian distribution
of income and a generous social security system. Health
care is need-based, universal, and tax financed. Specia-
lised care is organised in four health regions. There is no
second private tier.
Mental health care have been deinstitutionalised and
decentralised in recent decades. In the period from 1990
to 2006, in-patient days declined by 43 per cent. At the
same time, more patients were treated, and the expendi-
tures in specialist mental health services had a real growth
of 175 per cent from 1998–2007 [30]. In 2012, 198 invol-
untary admissions per 100 000 inhabitants took place [31].
The right to use coercion in mental health care is reg-
ulated by the Norwegian Mental Health Care Act of
1999. GPs refer the person to admission. A psychiatrist
or hospital-based psychologists with clinical specialist
qualifications make the admission decisions based on the
criteria presented in Table 2. The decision-maker must
reasonably believe that the person is suffering from a ser-
ious mental disorder, but it is not required a separateTable 2 Criteria for involuntary observation and treatment un
with later amendments)
Criterion Description
Disorder The patient is suffering from a serious mental di
Voluntariness Voluntary care has been tried, to not avail, or it
Necessary treatment The application of compulsory mental health ca
her health being restored or significantly improv
the person concerned will significantly deteriora
Risk of harm The application of compulsory mental health ca
serious risk to his or her own life and health or
Best interest Compulsory care may only be applied when thi
constitutes an obvious and serious risk to the lifdetermination of decision-making capacity. Further, she
must believe that treatment is effective or can prevent risk
of harm to the person himself or to others. Involuntary
admission may only be applied when voluntary care has
been tried or it is obviously pointless to try this. Any in-
voluntary observation or treatment should be in the per-
son’s best interest and be the least restrictive alternative.
Nordic mental health care legislation is based on a confi-
dence in psychiatry as a profession and involuntary admis-
sion does not require a court verdict [22]. However, when
a person is placed under compulsory mental health care,
notification must be sent to a supervisory commission
which is designed to be a guarantor of legal protection.
This commission is appointed by the Ministry, consists of
a doctor and two lay members, and is chaired by a lawyer.
The patient may appeal the decision after the admission
has taken place. A patient who voluntarily is under mental
health care may not be transferred to involuntary care un-
less she constitutes a risk to herself or others.
The human rights structure already part of the
Norwegian legal system was strengthened from 1999
when the Norwegian Human Rights Act stipulated thatder the Norwegian Mental Health Care Act (1999 No. 62
sorder and has been examined by two independent physicians; and
is obviously pointless to try this; and
re is necessary to prevent the person from having the prospects of his or
ed considerably reduced, or it is highly probable that the condition of
te in the vey near future; or
re is necessary to prevent the person from constituting an obvious and
those of others; and
s appears to be the best solution for the person, unless he or she
e or health of others.
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Convention of Human Rights, take precedence over
Norwegian law. Thus, legal protection against involun-
tary admission in mental health care is based on several
international resolutions and human rights conventions.
The Mental Health Care Act is considered to be in ac-
cordance with the UN Mental Illness Principles [22].
Participants
10 clinicians (psychiatrists/psychologist) with extensive
experience with admission decisions, working at three dif-
ferent health enterprises from different parts of Norway,
were interviewed in 2013. The sample was partly identi-
fied ex ante according to the position and experience the
participants held, and partly by chain-referral, where the
initial set of relevant participants was supplied with clini-
cians nominated by those already interviewed. Thus, we
used a non-probability sampling approach: The partici-
pants were chosen exactly because they were regarded as
experienced and well-knowing decision-makers [32].
The number of participants is small. Had we used an
inductive approach, such as grounded theory, we would
have included participants until no novel topics were
raised during the interviews (saturation). In this study,
however, we did not aim to explore a range of themes
grounded in the data itself. An analytical framework was
used to aid in defining an appropriate description and
interpretation. We wanted to find out how the partici-
pants framed their views, why they held these views and
how they made connections among options. The num-
ber of participants was determined to be adequate to
answer our research questions, given limited time and
resources.
Interviews
Data was collected by means of qualitative in-depth expert
interviews. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted
1- to 1,5 hours. They were based on an interview guide
which was thematically organised. The participants were
asked about their reflections about: Variation in involun-
tary admission rates; the legal criteria for involuntary ad-
mission; the communication with patients about voluntary
and involuntary admission; the availability of resources;
and the reasons behind discharge decisions. Open-ended
responses were allowed to uncover as much information as
possible. The participants were asked to ensure that they
did not reveal the identity of any patients when they dis-
cussed challenging situations.
All interviews were conducted in Norwegian and audio-
taped. The most relevant parts were transcribed and
translated into English. Each participant was given the
opportunity to review the relevant transcript. The tran-
scribed data was then grouped into two themes, which
again were divided into sub-issues. The first theme,reflections on the legal criteria for involuntary admission,
was divided into sub-issues according to different legal cri-
teria (mental disorder; voluntariness; necessary treatment;
risk of harm to oneself; risk of harm to others; overall best
interest). The second theme, reflections on professional
role and integrity, was divided according to institutional
factors and external pressure.
Ethical approval
Since the purpose of this study was to generate know-
ledge about health services (and not health per see), and
data gathered and stored was information about clini-
cians’ attitudes and beliefs, the study was not covered by
the Norwegian Health Research Act (and should not be
submitted to the Regional Committee for Medical and
Health Research Ethics). The study was submitted to the
Data Protection Official for Research, Norwegian Social
Science Data Services. It was approved in relation to the
Norwegian Data Act (project no.33762).
Results
Understanding and interpreting the legal criteria
Mental disorder
A necessary condition for involuntary mental health care
to be applied is that the patient is suffering from a ser-
ious mental disorder. This term is a legal one and not a
medical diagnosis. The Norwegian Supreme Court has
interpreted the term as to include a psychosis or as a
reduction in functioning equivalent to what is seen in
psychosis [33]. The participants in our study had a simi-
lar understanding:
“A serious mental disorder is defined and described as
a psychosis (…). A psychosis is a psychosis and in
reality you don’t need a specific diagnosis (…). Then
you have the other group, well, the thought is that you
will identify a group with very severe personality
disorders. The functional failure is described as
comparable to a psychosis”.“A serious mental disorder is a description of a
person’s functioning more than a diagnosis, it is about
a person’s ability to understand reality and her
understanding and ability to make choices regarding
her own mental condition”.
Voluntariness
According to the Mental Health Care Act, voluntary men-
tal health care must have been tried, to not avail, or it has
been found obviously pointless to try this before involun-
tary mental health care is applied. Most of the participants
did not consider this criterion to be useful in their
decision-making. Some reported that promoting voluntary
options were not prioritised. Although they thought that a
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would be the best decision making procedure, it was rarely
tried out. The common attitude seemed to be that trying
voluntary solutions were pointless in most cases:
“If the patient is considered to be suffering from a
serious mental disorder, the patient is obviously not
autonomous and thus not able to make rational
decisions. So why should I try and convince the patient
to voluntarily receive treatment?”“You will very soon get an impression of whether the
person will volunteer or not”.
However, the participants also made the point that the
Norwegian prohibition against transfer from voluntary
to involuntary mental health care adds to the complexity
when interpreting the voluntariness-criterion. One partici-
pant stated that clinicians may not put much effort into
deliberation about voluntary care, because of the high risk
for involuntary readmission after discharge. From the cli-
nician’s point of view, this procedure seemed “inconveni-
ent” and “ineffective”. Another of the participants pointed
out that the voluntariness- criterion seems to be grounded
in a poor understanding of the actual choice situation of
the decision-maker:
“When I hear politicians and others in media say that
voluntary solutions are always best (…) I think that:
You have no idea what you are talking about”.
Necessary treatment
Most decisions on involuntary mental health care in
Norway are based on expectations about effect of treat-
ment [34]. The treatment-criterion is described as hav-
ing the prospect of health being restored or significantly
improved considerably reduced, or it is highly probable
that the condition will significantly deteriorate in the
very near future. Some of the participants reported that
they often based involuntary admission on this criterion.
The assessment of effect seemed to be grounded either
on information about “the previous experience with the
actual patient” or on “a comparison with similar cases”.
Others, however, found this criterion difficult to under-
stand and to use. Those who regarded this criterion as
“difficult” had different reasons for their evaluation. One
of the participants believed that withholding treatment
“almost never” resulted in considerable worsening of con-
dition, and pointed out that “the coercive aspect of the ad-
mission and treatment might deteriorate the possibility of
effect”. Others draw attention the fundamental difficulty of
evaluating whether or not the patient would experience
considerable improvement from treatment. In some cases,
treatment would be expected not to have effect:“These are patients that have symptoms of psychosis even
when they are medicated and when committed, they get
restless and aggressive, making their condition worse”.
The treatment-criterion seemed, on the other hand, to
be used more frequently in decisions about discharge.
Risk of harm to oneself
If mental health care is necessary to prevent a person
constituting an obvious and serious risk to his or her
own life and health or that of others, involuntary admis-
sion may be applied. The harm-to-oneself criterion was
regarded as met by all the participants if the person
involved was suicidal. The current legislation does not,
however, indicate that risk of suicide is a sufficient con-
dition for involuntary mental care, and this was pointed
out by most participants. Still, several of the participants
reported that the health enterprises were recommended
to apply involuntary mental health care to suicidal persons
even when the disorder-criterion is not met, and found
this practice to contradict the intention of the law:
“The hospital emergency centers and the regional
psychiatric centers have received strong signals that
when it comes to suicidal patients, they should always
use compulsory observation (…) It is several years
since the mental health care have practiced this in a
proper legal manner”.“When it is claimed by a patient that he is suicidal,
most health care practitioners are not that concerned
about whether or not the main criterion of serious
mental disorder is present (…). I think this is wrong.
It is actually legal to commit suicide”.
The political signals from health care authorities on
this issue were regarded as confusing:
“The government wants it both ways. They (the
government) want the use of force to be reduced, but
at the same time they want to make sure that no one
takes his own life”.
Risk of harm to others
To determine whether or not the harm-to-others criter-
ion should be applied, the previous experience with the
person was considered relevant. The participants found
this criterion difficult to use, however, both because the
risk of harm to others was found to be “inherently diffi-
cult to predict” and because this criterion is not suffi-
ciently specified. As one of the participants said:
“The harm-to-others-criterion is (…) a pretty
challenging text to interpret. The harm-to-others-
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the treatment-criterion”.
Best interest
According to the legal text, an overall assessment of
how beneficial involuntary mental health care may be
for the person concerned must be carried out, even
though the other criteria are met. The participants re-
ported that they used a range of different criteria when
assessing the overall benefit of involuntary care, such as:
Need; Degree of opposition against care; Expected benefit
of care; Expected functioning outside institution; Profes-
sional follow-up; Housing, social network, and depen-
dents; Previous experience with the person.
The best interest criterion was understood as an infor-
mal decision rule by the participants. They did not use a
checklist or an assessment tool. Some considered a
variety of different factors, others only a few. Expected
functioning outside institution was considered by most.
The participants would evaluate the social and family
network of the person, and the person’s ability to eat,
sleep and control her impulses outside institution. Some
thought that the present housing situation and profes-
sional follow-up routines were very important:
“I would look into the practicalities (…) Are the
services the patient needs available? Does the patient
have a place to live?”“If a sufficient number of (…) adequate apartments
and services are provided, then I would imagine the
use of compulsory admissions to be reduced”.
Considerations about the present family situation were
similarly pointed out:
“If for instance there are children in the home, one
would maybe to a larger extent continue treatment
than one would if there are no children in the home”.
Understanding the professional role and integrity
Institutional factors
All of the participants reported that institutional factors,
such as the culture of the institution in which they worked
and the professional norms developed through practice,
would be relevant for their decision making. One said:
“The colleagues will influence your decisions. You are
socialised into a certain way of thinking”.
Institutional factors also included the practices of the
supervisory commission. Several of the participants pointed
out that over time, the use of involuntary mental care will
be ”shaped by the practice of the supervisory commission”.When asked if one thought colleagues at other institu-
tions would interpret the legal text differently from
themselves, the answers varied. Some of the participants
based their impression about colleague’s decision making
on discussions within the profession and claimed that
there was a “mutual understanding of the use of involun-
tary admission”. Others, however, stated that many clini-
cians did not know the content of the law:
“Many do not even know that suicidal disposition
should be assessed against the additional criteria, but
believe that this alone is enough to commit someone”.External pressure
In Norway, there have been several political initiatives to
reduce the use of coercion in mental health care. The
participants reported that they did not take political rec-
ommendations into consideration when making deci-
sions about involuntary admissions:
“I will not be influenced by signals from for instance
the Minister of Health. I would consider him as an
authority, yes, but he does not have thirty years of
experience. He is a person that has received
information from others. Maybe inexperienced
physicians would listen”.“Physicians and other health care practitioners making
these decisions are usually very independent and
confident in their own evaluation, and will not let
non-professionals influence their decisions”.Discussion
The criteria listed in the Norwegian Mental Health Care
Act specify the circumstances in which a person may be
placed under involuntary mental health care. The Act
applies what has been called a status approach [8],
whereby the presence and severity of a mental disorder
and the need for treatment or perceived risk to the pa-
tient or others is necessary for the legality of use of coer-
cion. The disorder-criterion is briefly stated in the legal
text. It does not use medical diagnoses, nor is a list of
disorders of mental function given. Further, a clinical
model of substitute decision-making [35] is prescribed.
The clinician is appointed to act in the best interest of
the person if the person lacks capacity to understand the
nature and purpose of treatment options and to make
informed and reasoned decisions about treatment.
As pointed out by Dawson, criteria such as these are
“considered, applied, stretched, and occasionally ignored
in key decisions in compulsory assessment and treat-
ment procedures” [12]. In the following, we discuss the
participants’ interpretation of the criteria.
Feiring and Ugstad BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:500 Page 8 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/500The participants knew the content of relevant criteria
and they accepted the authority of the legal text. How-
ever, the study shows how clinical decision-makers are
given wide latitude to act in the health interests of the
mentally disordered. The participants seemed to make use
of a functional interpretation of the disorder-criterion.
There was a tendency to equate serious mental disorder
with loss of decision-making capacity. The abilities needed
for persons to decide for themselves about treatment
seemed to receive little attention. Although a deliberation
about different options with the person was described as
an ideal decision-making procedure, using time to con-
vince the person of mental care was regarded as pointless
in most cases. The person’s capacity for autonomous
choice was not formally assessed. Rather, the participants
described how they would assess decision-making capacity
discretionally. This finding was categorised as an indica-
tion of paternalistic oriented reasoning. According to
the paternalistic attitude-to-coercion, a person lacking
capacity should be given treatment against his will if
there is reason to believe that is in the person’s best
interest and the option to be preferred by him had he
been of sound mind.
Norwegian legal standards for involuntary admission are
defined in terms of mental disorder linked to consequences
if not treated or cared for. The references to treatment
given in the Act are controversial, as a prognosis is difficult
without a diagnosis. We found different opinions regarding
the treatment-criterion represented among the partici-
pants, indicating that paternalistic, deliberative and inter-
pretative oriented arguments were used. While some of the
participants found this criterion useful, and used informa-
tion from prior treatment of the person or similar cases to
assess the likely effects of treatment, others pointed out the
difficulties of using this criterion in situations where no ef-
fective treatment is available, or where the negative effects
of involuntary treatment are perceived to outweigh the
positive treatment-effects. The participants’ statements
about the treatment-criterion seemed to reflect the on-
going scientific debate about effect of involuntary treat-
ment of mental disorders, given the lack of reliable
effect-studies [34].
The risk-of-harm-criterion poses specific challenges,
as it is inherently difficult to predict rare events such as
suicide or violence. Studies have shown that that risk of
suicide is insufficient warrant for involuntary treatment
[36], and there is no evidence that violence is more
predictable in those with mental disorders [37]. The par-
ticipants in our study regarded the condition of risk of
harm to oneself to be met if the person involved was suf-
fering from a mental disorder and was suicidal. In these sit-
uations, involuntary admission would be used. However,
the practice of protecting persons without a mental dis-
order from taking their own life was interpreted as to beagainst the intention of the law. Further, the risk-of- harm-
to-others seemed irrelevant to the participants. Their main
focus was the health of the individual person, not public
safety. These statements were interpreted as representing
paternalistic oriented reasoning about the health interests
of the mentally disordered versus the protection of others.
The Act has incorporated a best-interest-criterion
whereby the clinical decision-maker is required to act in
the best interest of the person. No formal assessment
tool is developed. We found that assessment of best inter-
est carries a large burden in the decision-making process.
The participants reported a range of different conditions
that were taken into consideration. The best-interest-
criterion opens for potentially large variations in practice.
Both socialisation processes involving colleagues and the
respective supervisory commissions will come to play im-
portant roles in shaping practice. The participants seemed
to give much weight to expected functioning outside insti-
tution but did not mention considerations of factors like
integrity loss or distrust, as we would have expected if in-
terpretive arguments were used.
Deliberative ideals – paternalistic practices?
Since the beliefs about patient autonomy and decision-
making capacity have shifted and a less paternalistic ap-
proach to the clinician-patient relationship has developed,
we expected the participants in this study to base their re-
flections about involuntary admission on deliberative- or
interpretive-oriented arguments.
The investigation revealed, however, that much of the
participants’ reasoning fit into a paternalistic framework.
The participants used their skills to observe and deter-
mine the patient’s medical condition and to identify
whether he was suffering from a serious mental disorder.
Severely disordered patients were assumed to have low
level of insight, and in most cases it was considered
pointless to try voluntary mental health care. Involuntary
admission was assessed necessary for attaining auton-
omy and dignity. Further, the participants pragmatically
choose to adhere to local health authorities’ recommenda-
tion to admit suicidal patients even if the necessary legal
criteria for involuntary admission were not met. The par-
ticipants were reluctant to assess whether or not the pa-
tient was at risk of harming others, and hesitated to assess
societal consequences of untreated mental disorder.
At the same time, deliberative oriented reasoning was
found. Some of the participants explained that they pref-
erably would follow a deliberative ideal regarding patient
autonomy and decision-making capacity. Some regarded
involuntary admission as necessary to provide care, but
considered the treatment effect of coercion as uncertain.
Some considered a range of diverse factors to be of im-
portance when assessing whether involuntary admission
was the overall best solution for the patient involved.
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itself, such as housing, social network, and follow up-
options.
Our study suggests that a deliberative ideal lapses into
paternalistic oriented reasoning in practice. The partici-
pant attitudes may seem puzzling. Self-contradictory
findings in this field have, however, been reported previ-
ously. A study of attitudes towards paternalism, patient
autonomy and moral deliberation in the clinician-patient
relationship, found that 37 per cent of the whole popula-
tion of doctors was ambivalent [38]. In a study of staff
members encounters with patients in psychiatric care, a
majority of the statements could be attributed to a pa-
ternalistic perspective, but there was also an awareness
of patients’ right to autonomy [29]. Another study con-
cluded that psychiatrists tended to agree with paternal-
istic attitudes towards the use of coercion in mental
health care, but still disagreed with the statement that
effective treatment is more important than patient self-
determination [22].
Several factors may explain why paternalistic oriented
reasoning prevails. Insecurity in the professional role
may push practitioners towards a paternalistic attitude
in order to reduce medical uncertainty [38]. However,
the participants in this study revealed strong profes-
sional identity and trust in their professional role. An-
other factor that may be involved is the sense of urgency
that describes the choice situation. We may speculate
that participants in this study view the decision-making
in this context as an emergency given the limit of re-
sources and time. According to Emanuel and Emanuel’s
discussion of ideal interaction, a paternalistic response
would then be justifiable:
“Clearly, under different clinical circumstances
different models may be appropriate (…) Thus it is
widely agreed that in an emergency where delays in
treatment to obtain informed consent might
irreversibly harm the patient, the paternalistic model
correctly guides physician-patient interaction” [28].
As pointed out by Pelto-Piri et. al., shifting from pater-
nalism to a perspective where the focus is on the inter-
action between the professionals, the patient and her
family may involve greater complexity and seems diffi-
cult in practice [29]. Yet, the intention of the Norwegian
Mental Health Care Act is violated if actual decision
making behavior accord with a paternalistic attitude. Of
course the Act cannot address all the complex issues
raised in this context, and the legal criteria cannot re-
place moral deliberation among clinicians. The doctrine
of proportionality requires, however, that any exemption
from the European Human Rights Convention must be
to the minimum extent possible. If the findings bears aresemblance to current thinking among the clinician
population, a greater awareness of how human rights are
incorporated in the legislative background against which
the Mental Health Care Act is developed, is called for.
Limitations
Four important limitations are worth pausing over. First,
we used a deductive theoretical approach and developed
three attitudes-to-cohesion ideal types to guide our analysis
by focusing on crucial aspects of different types of inter-
action, free from complicating details. Decision-making is
complex in mental health care. When applying precon-
ceived categories, important factors may have been left out
of the study. Second, the aim of this study was not to gen-
eralise from this sample to the population, but to obtain in-
formation about important aspects of decision making
with regard to involuntary admission from those who are
closely involved (i.e. clinical decision-makers). The sample
is small, and we do not know to which extent the sample
resembles the population of interest. Third, we do not
know how the participants actually make decisions. Their
attitudes may not accord with actual behavior. Fourth, ex-
pert interviews may of course be framed by partial re-
sponses. The participants were well-educated and highly
knowledgeable subjects. They may have wanted to slant
their accounts in order to appear consistent, rational and
independent of pressure. These limitations are inherent in
the design of this study.
Conclusions
Legal criteria for involuntary admission under the
Norwegian Mental Health Care Act are open for discre-
tion by the decision-making clinician. Considerably
variation in how the law is understood, interpreted and
operationalised may emerge. This study has shown how
reasoning about legal criteria is influenced by clinicians’
understanding of paternalism, patient autonomy and
moral deliberation. We expected the recent shift to-
wards less paternalism within health care to be mirrored
in this study.
Findings suggest, however, that a deliberative ideal of the
clinician-patient relationship and corresponding attitudes-
to-coercion lapses into paternalistic oriented argumenta-
tion in practice. The participants regarded considerations
of the vulnerability of the person to be more important
than considerations about lack of capacity to make deci-
sions about their own health risks. Further, the costs of
treatment imposed on an unwilling person relative to ben-
efits were minimised. The participants were reluctant to
give much weight to predictive risk assessments concern-
ing public safety. Decisions about involuntary admissions
also seem to be informed by a range of extra-legislative
factors, such as the patient’s need, degree of opposition
against care, expected benefit of care, expected functioning
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ing, network and dependents, and previous experiences
with the patient. These findings indicate the complexity of
moral deliberation regarding these decisions. The role of
different values in balancing favorable effects and disadvan-
tages of the use of coercive measures must be recognised.
This balancing is a matter of clinical professionals’ discre-
tion. Thus, legal norms cannot be the only resource guide
for decision-makers, and should be supplemented with
professional guidelines.
Modern psychiatry has been described by Welsh and
Deahl as “uncomfortably wedged between the territories
of law and medicine, between coercion and care” [3].
They pointed out that identification of the reasons why
psychiatrists make certain decisions, and assessment of
these choices for consistency and consequences, is im-
portant for the profession to begin to develop moral
justification. This study adds data which hopefully will
advance research in this field.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
EF participated in the design of the study. For the purpose of this article, EF
developed the theoretical framework, analysed and interpreted the data, and
wrote the article. KNU participated in the design of the empirical part of this
study and collected data as part of his master thesis project. Both authors
gave final approval of the version to be published.
Acknowledgements
We thank the participants who generously gave their time in order to
contribute to this research. We would also like to thank the reviewers for
their thought-provoking comments.
Received: 26 April 2014 Accepted: 6 October 2014
References
1. Le Grand J: Motivation, agency, and public policy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; 2006.
2. Prinsen EJD, van Delden JJM: Can we justify eliminating coercive
measures in psychiatry? J Med Ethics 2009, 35:69–73.
3. Welsh S, Deahl MP: Modern psychiatric ethics. Lancet 2002, 359:253–255.
4. Sibitz I, Scheutz A, Lakeman R, Schrank B, Schaffer M, Amering M: Impact of
coercive measures on life stories: qualitative study. BJP 2011, 199:239–244.
5. Kogstad RE: Protecting mental health clients’ dignity – the importance of
legal control. Int J Law Psychiatry 2009, 32:383–391.
6. Høyer G: Involuntary hospitalization in contemporary mental health care.
Some (still) unanswered questions. J Ment Health 2008, 17:281–292.
7. Owen GS, Szmukler G, Richardson G, Davis AS, Raymond V, Freyenhagen F,
Martin W, Hotopf M: Decision-making capacity for treatment in
psychiatric and medical in-patients: cross-sectional, comparative study.
BJP 2013, 203:461–467.
8. Okai D, Owen G, McGuire H, Singh S, Churchill R, Hotopf M: Mental
capacity in psychiatric patients: systematic review. BJP 2007, 191:291–297.
9. Lepping P: Overestimating patients’ capacity. BJP 2011, 199:355–356.
10. Kallert TW, Katsakou C, Adamowski T, Dembrimskas A, Fiorillo A, Kjellin L:
Coerced hospital admission and symptom change – a prospective
observational multi-centre study. PLoS ONE 2011, 6(11):e28191.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028191.
11. Singh JP, Fazel S, Gueorguieva R, Buchanan A: Rates of violence in patients
classified as high risk by structured risk assessment instruments.
BJP 2014, 204:180–187.12. Dawson J: Psychopathology and civil commitment criteria. Med Law Rev
1996, 4:62–83.
13. Steinert T, Schmid P: Effect of voluntariness of participation in treatment
on short-term outcome of inpatients with schizophrenia. Psychiatr Serv
2004, 55:786–791.
14. Steinert T, Lepping P, Bernhardsgrütter R, Conca A, Hatling T, Janssen W,
Keski-Valkama A, Mayoral F, Whittington R: Incidence of seclusion and
restraint in psychiatric hospitals: a literature review and survey of
international trends. Sos Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 2010, 45:889–897.
15. Wynn R: Coercion in psychiatric care: clinical, legal, and ethical
controversies. Int J Psychiatry Clin Pract 2006, 10:247–251.
16. Salize HJ, Dressing H: Epidemiology of involuntary placement of mentally
ill people across the European Union. BJP 2004, 184:163–268.
17. Myklebust LH, Sørgaard K, Wynn R: Local psychiatric beds appear to
decrease the use of involuntary admission: a case-registry study.
BMC Health Serv Res 2014, 14:64.
18. Lepping P, Steinert T, Gebhardt R, Rudinger P, Röttgers H: Attitudes of
mental health professionals and lay-people towards involuntary
admission and treatment in England and Germany – a questionnaire
analysis. Eur Psychiatry 2004, 19:91–95.
19. Husum TL, Bjørngaard JH, Finset A, Ruud T: Staff attitudes and thoughts
about the use of coercion in acute psychiatric wards. Sos Psychiatry
Psychiatr Epidemiol 2011, 46:893–901.
20. Brooks R: U.S. Psychiatrists’ beliefs and wants about involuntary civil
commitment grounds. Int J Law Psychiatry 2006, 29:13–21.
21. Luchins DJ, Cooper AE, Hanrahan P, Rasinski K: Psychiatrists’ attitudes
towards involuntary hospitalization. Psychiatr Serv 2004, 55:1058–1060.
22. Diseth RR, Bøgwald KP, Høglend PA: Attitudes among stakeholders
towards compulsory mental health care in Norway. Int J Law Psychiatry
2011, 34:1–6.
23. Wynn R, Myklebust LH, Bratlid T: Psychologists and coercion: decisions
regarding involuntary psychiatric admission and treatment in a group of
Norwegian psychologists. Nord J Psychiatry 2007, 61:433–437.
24. Steinert T, Lepping P, Baranyi R, Hoffman M, Lehrer H: Compulsory admission
and treatment in schizophrenia. A study of ethical attitudes in four
European countries. Sos Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 2005, 40:635–641.
25. Engleman N, Jobes D, Berman A, Langbein L: Clinicians’ decision making
about involuntary commitment. Psychiatr Serv 1998, 49:941–945.
26. Boyatzis RE: Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code
development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; 1998.
27. Yin RK: Case Study Research (3rd ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; 2003.
28. Emanuel EJ, Emanuel LL: Four models of the physician-patient
relationship. JAMA 1992, 267:2221–2226.
29. Pelto-Piri V, Engstöm K, Engström I: Paternalism, autonomy and
reciprocity: ethical perspectives in encounters with patients in
psychiatric in-patient care. BMC Med Ethics 2013, 14:49.
30. Johannessen HA, Dieserud G, Claussen B, Zahl PH: Changes in mental
health services and suicide mortality in Norway: an ecological study.
BMC Health Serv Res 2011, 11:68.
31. Norwegian Directorate of Health: Bruk av tvang i psykisk helsevern for voksne
2012. Oslo: Norwegian Directorate of Health IS-0410; 2013.
32. Tansey O: Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for
Non-probability sampling. PS: Polit Sci Polit 2007, 4:765–772.
33. Syse A: Psykisk helsevernloven med kommentarer. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk
Forlag; 2004.
34. Diseth RR, Høglend PA: Compulsory mental health care in Norway. The
treatment criterion. Int J Law Psychiatry 2014, 37:168–173.
35. Dawson J, Szmukler G: Fusion of mental health and incapacity legislation.
BJP 2006, 188:504–509.
36. Callaghan S, Ryan C, Kerridge I: Risk of suicide is insufficient warrant for
coercive treatment for mental illness. Int J Law Psychiatry 2013, 36:374–385.
37. Szmukler G, Holloway F: Reform of the mental health Act: health or
safety? BJP 2000, 177:196–200.
38. Falkum E, Førde R: Paternalism, patient autonomy, and moral deliberation
in the physician-patient relationship. Attitudes among Norwegian
physicians. Soc Sci Med 2001, 52:239–248.
doi:10.1186/s12913-014-0500-x
Cite this article as: Feiring and Ugstad: Interpretations of legal criteria
for involuntary psychiatric admission: a qualitative analysis. BMC Health
Services Research 2014 14:500.
